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Ethnic distance is a theoretical concept that is prevalent within political science and 
political economy as a metric in calculating group heterogeneity but has been difficult 
to apply in terms of making actual empirical measurements. Ethnic distance can be 
considered in two related ways. The first can be conceived as the relative variation 
within and between specific ethnic populations in social or geographic space and 
supervenes on the individual in the costs of identifying ethnic in-group members from 
out-group members. The most widely used metric in the literature is language which is 
made more complex in that there are multiple level differentiating linguistic forms and 
criteria for measurement. I suggest the development of a measure of linguistic distance 
that uses the Levenshtein algorithm to produce a numeric value of pronunciation 
distance by calculating the number of changes that is needed to transform one 
linguistic string into another. As this value is numeric it can be applied to statistical 
measures measuring linguistic heterogeneity at the population level and is sensitive 
enough to detect dialectical differences and can be applied to experimental work on 
the ethnic identification or location of individuals within a particular language 
community. 
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The effects of ethnic heterogeneity on a wide range of political and economic 
outcomes, such as civil and ethnopolitical conflict and economic growth have been a 
central aspect of many studies in political science and political economy
1
. The 
findings and results of many of these studies as linked to a particular causal outcome 
often contradict each other due to a number of conceptual problems related to theory 
interlinked with a number of practical problems related to empirical measurement. 
These theoretical problems and problems of measurement will be addressed using a 
methodology developed within field of comparative politics and includes sections on  
theory, statistical models,  tests and experiments as well as an historical narrative set 




The first section deals with a basic coding schema for ethnic groups and relies 
on the concept of an ethnic group prototype with radial categories, a related 
description of ethnic identities, the spatial distribution and the sizes of the major ethnic 
groups with the region. The last aspect is made more complex in that there are 
multiple ethnic dimensions, such as including racial, linguistic or cultural traits and 
that any one particular category has multiple levels. As such any one individual can be 
disaggregated along multiple ethnic dimensions and along different levels of any one 
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dimension. This section ends with a brief discussion of ethnic distance at both the 
population and individual levels of analysis.  
As these groups and distributions are social constructions and products of 
political, economic, cultural and historic forces they can materialize or disappear, 
expand or contract in size and can also grow more culturally or linguistically similar 
or distant as individuals enact processes such as assimilation, differentiation or 
through political amalgamation or disintegration. This means the collectives these 
aggregations define are also fluid. These processes are examined through a historical 
narrative spanning the period from 1850 to 1953 within Northeast Asia. This period 
saw the transformation of both the ethnic demographies and identities of ethnic groups 
in the region into major ethno-national groups as well as the emergence of new 
political economies where ethnic rather than class distinctions became politically 
salient. Regularities within the narrative are juxtaposed to patterns of mobilization as 
well as inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic forms of conflict. This includes both violent 
conflict such as inter-state conflict or intra-state or transnational insurgencies as well 
as non-violent ethnic conflict such as systematic exploitation and discrimination based 
on ethnic perimeters.  
These changes in ethnic group dimensions are dealt with theoretically in the 
third section in the exploration of two constructivist theories dealing within the 
relationship between ethnic group change and conflict. The first theory posited by 
Deutsch (1953) relies on macro-level processes such as assimilation, differentiation 
and physical mobilization to explain the construction of ethno-national identities. The 
emergence of national conflict occurs when a non-monotonic situation arises between 
two equally sized ethnically differentiated groups. The second theory developed by 
Fearon and Laitin (2000) view agency at the level of the individual rather than at the 
population and suggests a model of interdependent identity construction. Here ethnic 
3 
identities are determined by individual interactions where the categorization and 
content of ethnic identities is contested by members of in-groups which can lead to the 
construction of new identities which can lead to changes in cultural borders of the 
group. Violence erupts as a result to these changes in cultural perimeters.   
As these theories are meant to provide logical, coherent and non-contradictory 
explanations of political and economic outcomes and utilize similar processes these 
two explanations of their respective causal mechanisms are endogenized.  This is 
followed by an explanation of a constructivist framework of the relationship of both 
common and collective cultural and ethnic boundaries and is followed by the 
explanation of a computational test that can link the micro-level processes of identity 
selection suggested by Fearon and Laitin (2000) to the particular macro-level 
processes suggested by Deutsch (1953).  
The fourth section deals with conceptual and practical issues surrounding the 
measurement of ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity. This includes a non-weighted and 
weighted measure of fracture, a measure of community and a statistical measure of 
polarity. As both the weighted measure of fracture and polarity require a measure of 
ethnic or linguistic distance which is underdeveloped within the literature there is an 
introduction of a measure of linguistic distance that uses the Levenshtein algorithm to 
measure the pronunciation distance. This measure of distance can be applied to both 
macro-level statistical tests used for determining distances between ethnolinguistic 
demographies as well as micro-level experiments that are designed to determine ethnic 
identification within an interaction with a number of potential applications within the 




CURRENT ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHIES OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
The following is a brief description of the major ethnic and language 
communities within northeastern China, the Korean peninsula as well as Japan and is 
presented to give examples for both coding ethnic groups as well as providing a 
context for a number of concepts related to their structure.  
A set of particularly useful concepts for this task are that of a prototypical 
ethnic group and radial ethnic categories. A prototypical ethnic group is where 
membership is determined by descent rule which is both normatively and 
psychologically important to members of the group. Individual members of these 
groups also share a number of physical, cultural or linguistic traits which are also 
considered valuable as well as a collective history. Members of prototypical groups 
are often associated with a particular indigenous territory. These ethnic categories are 
radial in that if one or more ethnic features are removed save the descent-rule the 
group can still be viewed as ethnic albeit less prototypical.
3
 Similarly, ethnic group 
identities are determined by descent and sets of ethnic categories such as somatic or 
physiognomic features, skin color or cultural or linguistic traits as well as the content 
thought to be typical of any ethnic category by members of the group.
4
 Identities 
change as a result of individual decisions to contest either the particular categories or 
content areas within group’s boundaries because these rules, meanings and traits must 
be ultimately defined by the group. That is not to say that these changes do not occur 
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in a vacuum as other groups or political actors can influence their outcome.
5
 
Prototypical ethnic distributions change as a result of changed ethnic identities.  
The following is a brief description both ethnic and linguistic dimensions of 
major ethnic groups within northeast China, Korea and Japan and for the most part are 
prototypical. In northern China, the dominant ethnic group is the Han while the other 
major ethnic groups include the Manchu, Korean, Mongolian and the Hui.  
The members of the Han, Hui and Manchu groups in northeast China speak 
Chinese mainly from the Northeastern and Jiaoliao Mandarin groups. In Liaoning, the 
ethnic Han originated mainly from Hebei and Shandong provinces and as a result the 
Chinese spoken in southern Liaoning is similar to the Shangdong dialect and western 
Liaoning is similar to that of Hebei province. The Chinese spoken by the Hui in this 
region resembles the respective Han locals save a number of lexical items while the 
Chinese spoken by the ethnic Manchu highly resembles the Beijing dialect less a 
number of Manchu loan words preserved in the speech community which has become 
virtually extinct. Mongolian is spoken in areas where there are high ethnic 
concentrations and while most Mongolians can speak Chinese a small number of 
ethnic Mongolians have been fully assimilated. Another major non-Sinitic speech 
community in this region is the Korean ethnic group who number over 1,900,000 and 
are concentrated mainly in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin 
Province. Korean is commonly spoken by members of this group with approximately 
1,200,000 monolingual in their prototypical language.
6
  
The Korean language community extends down the peninsula into North 
Korea where there are approximately 22,700,000 ethnic Koreans and 51,000 Chinese 
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with another 42,000,000 ethnic Koreans in South Korea. The dialectical boundaries in 
both North and South Korea generally correspond to the provincial boundaries.
7
  
The Japanese archipelago is dominated by the Japanese ethnolinguistic 
community with approximately 121,050,000 speakers with dialectical divides between 
the Western and Eastern dialects and the minor Kagoshima dialect in Kyushu. There 
are also approximately 670,000 bilingual ethnic Koreans in Japan who are 
concentrated primarily around the Osaka area. The ethnic Ainu in Japan number at 
15,000 and have been generally assimilated by the dominant ethnic group and there 
also a number of Ryukyuan languages in and around Okinawa and that continue down 
the chain. Generally, the ethnic groups mentioned here are generally considered 




As this simple spatial distribution illustrates there are multiple ethnic 
categories evident at the population level and while ethnic or linguistic factors are 
mentioned here other categories such as religion could be added seeing multiple 
categories. These ethnic demographies are made more complex when considering that 
any one ethnic category may have multiple dimensions of ethnic cleavage. In terms of 
languages these levels would correspond to individual languages, dialects or sub-
dialects and as a result different sub-groups can be disaggregated from the same 
population. In Northeast Asia we see different aggregations within each language and 
within each dialect. For example, the Chinese languages include Mandarin, Gan, 
Hakka, Huizhou, Jinyu,, Min Bei, Min Dong, Min Nan, Min Zhong, Pu-Xian, Wu and 
Xiang. As a single Chinese language Mandarin can again be divided into the Northern, 
Northwestern, Southwestern, Lower Yangtze and Putonghua topolects. Any schema 
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that would link a particular outcome such as economic development to linguistic 
homogenization would have to account for what level of disaggregation one selects for 
analysis.  
A related concept is of ethnic or linguistic distance. This is a calculation of the 
diversity that exists within any one ethnic disaggregation as well as between 
disaggregated groups. A measure of linguistic distance could also be applied to the 
variation between the Cantonese and Mandarin groups mentioned above within a 
single country. It could also be used cross-nationally. For instance the a measure of 
linguistic distance could calculate the variation between the major Korean dialects 
such as the Hamgyong-do, P’yong’an-do and Hwanghae-do dialects in North Korea 
and the Seoul, Ch’ungchong-do, Kyongsang-do, Cholla-do and Cheju-do dialects in 
South Korea as well as any Korean speakers of these dialects in China and Japan. A 
measure of distance along lexical, semantic or syntactic perimeters of these forms 
would not necessarily reflect mutual intelligibility, however the more similar these 
languages or dialects are the less distant they are conceptually.  
Ethnic demographics can change in their overall numbers and in their relative 
sizes and can have both endogenous and exogenous sources. For example when the 
Man or Manchu group and the Hui group were assimilated into a Chinese language 
communities their relative borders changed statistically if measured along a language 
dimension. The same could be said of the opposite process of differentiation occurred 
or when members of a common language community re-categorize their speech forms 
as different languages or and actively differentiate their language for the purpose of 
sub-group identification.  
Ethnographic change also occurs when political boundaries change.
9
 
Expanding political borders often sees the amalgamation of smaller groups, linguistic 
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assimilation and the construction of a larger ethnic group while shrinking political 
borders often has the opposite effect as differentiation is often coupled with ethnic 
division along a particular cleavage dimension and the production of new ethnic 
groups. Changes in ethnic demographies can also occur from exogenous sources such 
as through the physical mobilization of an ethnic out-group into or out of another area 
or region dominated by other ethnic community through migration.
10
 
As there are multiple dimensions of ethnic cleavage at the population level, 
individuals at the local level can have multiple ethnic identities and use them 
strategically depending on the geographic or social context of an interaction.
11
 This 
multiplicity of ethnic identities or categories sees the potential for individuals to 
switch ethnic identities or try to pass as an ethnic other by speaking different 
languages or by other means to gain a comparative advantage within a particular 
interaction or transaction. This is particularly so in areas where ethnicity is politically 
salient or where either political coalitions are formed along ethnic perimeters or where 
access to political or economic goods or resources depends on ones ethnicity.
12
 Certain 
ethnic categories however may make it harder for certain individuals to pass or switch 
than others when considering certain physical traits. Skin color or racial features for 
instance are visible to other interlocutors while detecting language differences requires 
a speech act but in both cases any perceived differences or distances are relative and 
are subject to categorization.
13
  
At the individual level of interaction ethnic distance can be considered the 
costs of distinguishing ethnic group members from ethnic others.
14
 In situations where 
ethnicity is politically salient passing can be expensive for all the individuals and 
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groups involved. For example, access to human capital can be limited if there are 
ascriptive barriers to upward mobility based on ethnic or linguistic criteria. The 
dominant ethnic group or coalition must select lesser talented members of their own 
group for certain roles at the expense of highly talented ethnic others. Conversely, 
individuals who are trying or attempting to pass or switch may involve certain 
monetary and mental costs incurred in learning a new language, leaving dense social 
or economic networks as well as the potential psychic costs involved.
15
 Linguistic 
distance at the population level supervenes on the individual level in that where two 
speech forms are less distant at the population level they are easier to acquire and cost 
less than those which are more distant.  
As ethnic demographics change through processes such as assimilation or 
differentiation, amalgamation or division or through physical mobilization the next 
section is a narrative that focuses on the historical and social construction of the ethnic 
group identities and demographies within geographical context of Northeast Asia. As 
mentioned above it is done to try to detect any systemic regularities to discern how 
any particular values of the independent variables are transmitted onto the values of 
the dependant variables or interest, that is to how changes in ethnic identities or 
demographics produce situations of violence, exploitation or discrimination.
16
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CHANGES IN ETHNIC IDENTITIES AND DEMOGRAPHIES 
 
The ethnic demographics and identities of the major ethnic groups changed 
dynamically in Northeast Asia between the years 1850 and 1950. This period saw both 
the disintegration of the Sinocentric amalgamated and pluralistic political communities 
as well as the transition to modern political and economic systems first initiated Japan 
after the Meiji Restoration (1867-1868). The disintegration of the indigenous Chinese 
system saw a number of excessive military burdens on the government including 
internal ethnic and territorial fracture starting with the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) 
and external pressure first from the West including the First and Second Opium Wars 
(1839-1842) and (1856-1860) respectively and later from the Japanese with the First 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). These military defeats changed the political 
boundaries and the establishment of foreign spheres of influnce within China and were 
associated with a complex of factors which included the failure of a dominant Chinese 
state to adjust politically and psychologically to a changing environment which 
resulted in delayed social, economic and political reforms which had already become 
adopted in a modernizing Japan.
17
  
With intense Western attention on a dominant China, Japan had time and space 
to organize, homogenize and mobilize its human and material resources and until its 
victories in the first Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) 
faced the possibility of becoming a Western colony itself.
18
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The closure of the political elite in China and Korea promoted the rise of 
counter-elites among social strata and cultural out-groups producing ethno-
nationalistic leaders who stressed in-group values, interests as well as increases in 
ethnic and linguistic differentiation. This included a systemic change in the ethnic 
identities of major populations. The ethnic vernaculars as a radial category of Japan, 
China, Vietnam and Korea were re-categorized as ethno-national languages. This was 
a shift from Literary Sinitic which had been the state languages of each of these 
countries previous to the modern era in the region. This shift in ethnic categorization 
reflected new patterns of political saliency by ethnic rather than by class criteria and a 
change in terms of both identities in terms of categorization and content as these 
vernaculars were homogenized at the national level.
19
 
Previous to the modern period in the region the language regime of the states 
within the indigenous Sinitic political system was a multilingual configuration where 
there was political pillarization. Each region or speech community within China as 
well as the peripheral countries of Korea, Japan and Vietnam spoke their ethnic 
vernaculars and it was not necessary for any one ethnic individual in one pillar to learn 
the spoken languages of other pillars save the elite class who specialized in cross-pillar 
political communication and governance.
20
 The elite in each country was generated by 
the same political institutions or the Confucian examination system for which 
expertise in Literary or International Sinitic which was necessary for political, 
economic and social mobility.  This Confucian institutional structure was first 
developed during the Han Dynasty (206 BCE- 220 AD) and lasted in China until the 
formation of the Republic in 1911. This system lasted in Korea until the Japanese 
annexation in 1910 who had abandoned the system after the Meiji Restoration and the 
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transition to a modern state system and political economy which was subsequently 
expanded to Korea and Taiwan.
21
 
Literary Sinitic did not reflect a living Chinese speech form and was further 
divorced from speech as all auxiliaries, prepositions, endings and non-essential 
morphemes were intentionally omitted. This economy saw a terse, complicated and 
inefficient form that was extremely difficult to master taking generally taking between 
10-15 years to gain modicum of proficiency.
22
 This language provided a medium of 
elite political communication horizontally across geographic space but delineated the 
strata within each ethnic community producing a situation of diglossia or where status 
differentials between those competent in Literary Sinitic excluded speakers of any 
ethnic vernaculars. 
This contrasted with the spoken Sinitic languages that could be acquired much 
easier through emersion or assimilation.
23
 A vernacular had never been considered as a 
natural base for a national language for the Sinitic political community due to the elite 
cultural prejudice of writing vernaculars.
24
 The situation in medieval China differed 
from medieval Europe where Laitin was available as both a speech form and writing 
system for the educated elite and subsequently served as the base of the written 
European vernaculars. It was facilitated by an alphabet that be used to encode any 
variety of speech forms and as there were no conventions in medieval China for the 
alphabetic or syllabic spelling of Sinitic speech forms the other Sinitic languages 
remained unwritten and un-writable because set of sinographs although large was 
inadequate to record all the morphemes in spoken Sinitic vernaculars. This differed 
from both the European situation where French, German, Italian or English all 
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developed into national languages and also differs from the Indian tradition where 
major Indo-Aryan languages such as Hinidi, Marathi, Gujarti, and Oriya as well as the 
Dravidian languages such as Telugu, Tamil, or Malaysian developed as both spoken 
languages and writing systems.
25
 
In China only two writing forms had developed. These were Literary and 
Vernacular Sinitic. These systems reflected two distinct and competing forms of 
linguistic media from at least the Warring States period (475-249 BCE) and perhaps 
even earlier (1200 BCE) but when employed these two forms were seldom 
unalloyed.
26
 Both the Sinitic languages were decentralized and while the literary form 
did not reflect any living language the vernacular developed as a koine or a lingua 
franca developing out of a mixture of other languages. Vernacular Sinitic developed as 
a supra-dialectical speech form based on the topolects of Ch’ang, Loyang or K’aifeng, 
all capitals located along central section of Yellow River valley as early as the Tang 
Dynasty.
27
 The early Chinese equivalent for the koine is t’ung-yu or common 
language (the current name for Modern Standard Mandarin in People’s Republic of 
China or p’u-tung-hua,) and by the Song Dynasty (960-1279) it developed into a 
written vernacular used in popular literature and for limited bureaucratic functions. By 
the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) Vernacular Sinitic was referred to an official spoken 
language of the amalgamated Chinese political community and functioned as a 
prestige supra-dialect that was required for government officials to communicate due 
to the unintelligibility of the Sinitic topolects from around China. This meant for the 
majority of officials learning a second spoken language rather than adjusting their first 
language and when spoken by individuals from various areas of China outside urban 
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areas where it was based it was heavily affected by local pronunciations, lexical 
differences and to a lesser extent grammar as Modern Standard Mandarin is today.
28
 
The processes of modernization in Japan saw the formation of a strong state 
apparatus which engaged in national homogenization projects such as implementing a 
modern educational system, a modern communication and transportation infrastructure 
and modern military during the Meiji Restoration (1867-1868). The later was 
exercised in victories in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-1905). The architects of the Meiji Restoration had eliminated its 
aristocratic class as an institution and the ethnic vernacular was standardized on the 
dialect of the capital and re-categorized as an ethnonational language. This had the 
systemic effect of shifting the potential for increased upward mobility and access to 
institutions within the new system based on ethnic rather than class criteria as it 
shifted ascriptive categories generally acquired at birth.
29
  
These changes and re-categorizations of ethnic categories allowed substantial 
increases in mass political participation based on ethnic perimeters and a shift of 
political salience to ethnic identities, their radial categories and their content. This was 
a systemic change in that it was resisted but eventually followed by China in 1919 by 
adopting Vernacualr Sinitic or Mandarin as a standard language and this process was 
complicated in Korea and occurred only after 1945 with the end of Japanese 
occupation.  
The rise of Japan power also saw a shift in ethnic content. This power can be 
understood in terms of military growth but also in terms of the nature and number of 
loan words imported to the speech communities on the Asian mainland. While some in 
Japan called for the discontinuation of the wide spread use of Chinese characters all 




 Fogel (1996) 
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together for educational purposes, others felt that their abolition would assist a rising 
Japan to develop it own separate identity from Sinitic culture.
30
 These calls however 
were abandoned relative to the utility of Literary Sinitic within the region with more 
than 1000 two-character neologisms that were imported from Japan to China, Korea 
and Vietnam as loans.
31
 Many of these concepts were utilized to categorize new 
aspects of ethnonational identity and were used to mobilize large populations based on 
these content perimeters and definitions.  
The concept of ethno-national language or kuo-yu was one of these loans. It 
was originally used by the Chinese elite to categorize the languages of non-Sinitic 
ethnopolitical groups in both China and in its semi-periphery since the beginning of 
the common era and was applied to the Tabgatch (or T’o-pa in Modern Standard 
Mandarin), a proto-Mongol or Turkic people who established Northern Wei Dynasty 
(386-534) as well as the Saerbi (Shirvi) a proto-Mongol group in north central China 
who held considerable political and military power. It was also applied to the Altaic 
and Tungusics languages of the Khitan who established the Liao Dynasty (907-1125) 
and the Jurchen who had established the Jin Dynasty (1115-1234), the Mongolians 
during the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) and the Manchu who established the Ch’ing 
Dynasty (1644-1912) as well as to the Vietnamese, Koreans and Japanese groups. This 
semantic value of this term shifted to the meaning of a national language based on the 
ethnic vernacular of a dominant ethnic group in Japan in the 1850’s and subsequently 
was re-introduced to China, Vietnam and Korea at the turn of the century.
32
 
Another term can be exemplified in the transition of an ethnic to an 
ethnopolitical group. For example the term Han ren historically referred to an ethnic 
group that held power during the Han Dynasty however at the beginning of the 
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modern period we see the emergence of Han min or Han minzu (minju in Korean) 
derived from the Japanese minzoka which referred to an ethnopolitical or ethno-
national group.
33
 Invoking an argument that membership in any Sino-linguistic speech 
community was a constitutive feature of the Han ethno-national group saw the 
creation of an overwhelming dominant majority which consists of over ninety percent 
of the Chinese population.  
These examples provide empirical evidence of changes in ethnic identities in 
terms of re-categorization of an ethnic categories and shifts in ethnic identity content. 
It also saw the transition of the political salience of language from a diglossia 
determined by status differentials and a class dimension to one based on ethnic 




 Japan established itself as a colonial power relatively late compared to 
European powers and its form of imperialism differed from Western models in that it 
involved the colonization of contiguous territory in an attempt to maximize its 
comparative advantage as it was late to expand unlike the West. An aspect of this 
contiguous colonialism was the military residency of a strong land army acting as a 
coercive force and accompanied with institutional political and economic exploitation 
driven on ethnic lines. This was felt most strongly in Korea.
35
 Whereas Western 
colonial models relied on strong navies and small administrative bureaucracies the 
Japanese implanted a very large colonial bureaucracy. By the last decade of Japanese 
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rule in Korea, there were approximately 246,000 Japanese civil servants ruling 
21,000,000 ethnic Koreans while in 1937 the French had 2,900 colonial bureaucrats 
and a standing army of 11,000 ruling 17,000,000 Vietnamese.
36
  
This form of imperialism also differed from Western models as it located 
transportation and communications infrastructure into the colonial periphery bringing 
industry to stores of cheap labor and raw materials. This worked to economically 
integrate the Japanese core to the Korean periphery in creating a rapid exchange time 
in market relations and was later extended to Manchuria.
37
 The Japanese created an 
amalgamated transnational political economy in terms of its infrastructure but it lacked 
the key features necessary for political integration as it was a highly exploitative 
system with ascriptive barriers to upward mobility on ethnic perimeters. This 
produced patterns of dependence rather than interdependence and was furthered by the 
use of divisive tactics that created intra-ethnic fracture and polarization.  
The Japanese experiment in Korea can be described by three periods. The first 
is the period of military rule or the Budan Seiji (1910-1919) was marked by the 
implementation of new patterns of political and economic organization, 
institutionalized ethnic discrimination, exploitation and the development of a modern 
transportaion and communications infrastructure. The second phase, the Bunka Seiji 
or the period of cultural rule lasted from 1919 to 1937 and was marked by a lessening 
of the draconian political and cultural restrictions of the military era by allowing 
Korean forms of political and economic association including the use of Hangul 
newspapers. This period was also marked by regional economic stagnation, depression 
and the expansion of political boundaries with the formation of the puppet state of 
Manchukuo in 1932. This period also saw a new generation of economic and political 
                                                 
36




entrepreneurs unable to coordinate on an ethnic identity or agree on a means to 
achieve political autonomy. The last period lasting from 1937 to 1945 was the Naisne 
Ittai or the assimilation movement. This period was marked by the forced ethnic and 
linguistic assimilation and extensive mobilization of ethnic Koreans within the greater 
sphere due to preparations for Second Sino-Japanese War and later for World War II. 
This period also saw the development of an industrial base on the Korean peninsula 
which also had transformative effects on these ethnic populations within this political 
economy. 
The first nine years of the Japanese occupation saw the manipulation of 
regimes, indigenous groups and classes who would under normal circumstance have 
accomplished economic and political development. An example of this manipulation 
is the cadastral survey and land reformation project occurring from 1910 to 1918 
which saw the traditional landholding system changed to one based on a modern 
rational legal contract. This allowed the Japanese to obtain valuable properties but was 
also strategically divisive in that it firmly rooted the landlords to the land continuing 
the traditional patterns of economic exploitation as well as increasing tenancy. This 
had the effect of polarizing intra-Korean social strata as well as polarizing ethnic 
Koreans and ethnic Japanese. This exploitation was coupled with institutional 
discriminatory policies as the central judicial bodies’ legalized the ethnic 
discrimination of Koreans within their own country, inhibited the formation of Korean 
firms and put limits on the amount of Korean supplied investment capital for new and 
emerging Japanese firms in Korea.
38
 
The Japanese organizational and economic developmental model included a 
tripartite of state bureaucracy, state banking and state corporations which were used to 
link the Japanese political and economic core to the Korean and latter the Manchurian 
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peripheries. Key colonial banking institutions such as the Bank of Korea served the 
functions of a central bank such as regulating interest rates and providing credit to 
ethnic Japanese firms and entrepreneurs. These banks were integrated with major state 
companies such as the Oriental Development Company which owned 20% of arable 
land in Korea and who organized, funded and supervised industrial and agricultural 
projects.
39
  These state firms were not the only firms in operation. A small number of 
conglomerates including the big four of Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo and Yasuda 
were also tied to key banking and colonial state structures. These zaibatsu added the 
element of familial corporatism that is still so prevalent in the Korean chaebol and 




The Japanese utilized this organization to implement a modern transportation 
and communications infrastructure.
41
 The rails in Korea were laid on a skewed on a 
southeast to northwest axis which linked Japanese core to the colonies to the 
mainland. This had transformative effects on the Korean population. One major set 
linked the port of Pusan in the southeast to Taegu, Taejon, Seoul and Pyongyang on an 
axis that extended into Manchuria with another major line branched from Pyongyang 
to the eastern sea coast up to Chongjin and on into Siberia. Population growth and 
urbanization on these lines were tremendous. An obvious example on the central line 
is Taejon which grew from a small village to a major urban area within South Korea 
and its own dialectical area. On the second line the population in Nanjin near the 
Russian border in northeast grew from a population of 500 in 1927 to 26,000 by 1937 
and the nearby port of Chongjin was a small fishing village of 100 in 1910 grew to 
major port with a population of 72, 353 in 1938 and by 1940 was the largest port on 






 Cumings (1997) 
 20 
the Sea of Japan or the East Sea.
42
 In a comparative sense, China with a population of 
eight times that of Korea only carried two times the passengers on its rails during the 
1940’s and were mostly concentrated in the northeast while Vietnam had only a single 
line linking Hanoi to Saigon.
43
  
The Japanese also built roads. Previous to the annexation Korea was virtually 
roadless but by 1945 it was estimated that Korea had approximately 53,000 kilometers 
of auto and country roads and when compared to China which at that time had 
approximately 100,000 kilometers of traversable roads.
44
 By the end of the occupation 
Korea had the best transportation and infrastructure system in East Asia save Japan.  
The implementation of these transportation infrastructures fundamentally 
changed the social, cultural and economic dynamic of the Korean peninsula as they 
increased rates of the commercialization of agriculture, movement of commodities, 
labor and produced and increased new patterns of interactions and exchanges in 
regional and global markets. This period saw frequent peasant protests, rebellions and 
guerilla movements and produced strong currents of ethno-nationalism which the 
Japanese dealt with by coercion and direct action with a centrally controlled and 
highly mobile national military police force which was used to extract commodities 
such as rice as well as controling dissident within the mass population.  
This period ended violently with the Samil or March 1
st
 Movement in 1919 
where approximately 2 million ethnic Koreans were mobilized along ethno-national 
lines echoing calls for Wilsonian self-determination after Versallies. The perversity of 
the Japanese repression, which included torture, rape, terrorism and utter brutality 
differs by the reports of the outcome. According to Korean records over 45,000 were 
arrested, over 7000 killed and nearly 16,000 wounded. This differs significantly with 
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Japanese records stating that over 8,000 were arrested, over 550 killed and 
approximately 1400 were wounded but in anycase it led to a lessened political and 
economic restrictions and the second phase of Japanese rule in Korea.
45
  
The 1919 March 1
st
 movement in Korea and the May 5
th
 movement in China 
were watershed moments relative to Korean and Chinese ethno-nationalism. While in 
Korea, self-determination was a major reason for ethnic mobilization in China large 
populations were mobilized due to the Japanese annexation of Shandong Province as 
an aspect of the 21 Demands which included attempts to diminish Chinese sovereignty 
in its foreign affairs, influencing its domestic governance, national policing and 
established a Japanese sphere of influence in southern Manchuria. While Beijing 
entered the Allied Triple Entente in 1917 with the understanding that German spheres 
of influence in China be returned to domestic control, this decesion was reversed with 
the late Japanese involvment in the war.
46
  
While earlier concepts related to modernization had spread from Japan by the 
political elites who had studied or were in exile there by cultural diffusion, by 1919 
the Chinese realized the path to modernization taken by Japan would be impeded for 
them as it had been in Korea beginning in 1910. These movements in both Korea and 
China saw substantial increases in political participation by the mass populations and 
strata that were disenfranchised with the Confucian system, viewed it as archaic and 
its institutions as no longer useful or applicable to the modern system. As such 
fundamentalism did not arise as a legitimate form in this new modern political system. 
This new generation looked to science and technology as well as new ideologies 
imported from the modern West such as different forms of socialism, communism and 
anarchism that offered radical alternatives to other ideas such as Christianity and 
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liberalism which had been introduced since the 1850’s. It seems that these new leaders 
and parties viewed new social and political institutions and opportunities for social 
mobility and not the status quo.
47
  
The second period of Japanese rule in Korea or the Bunka Seiji began in 1919 
and lasted until 1937 at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The severity of the 
response to the March 1
st
 Movement and the international response marked a period of 
limited political association and communication. This included a transistion to a civil 
rather than military police force. This space also allowed a new generation of 
economic and political entrepreneurs to emerge but were unable to coordinate on an 
ethnic identity and routes to political autonomy producing intra-ethnic ideological 
fracture and was furthered by the geographic dispersion of the Korean group dividing 
those who remained in exile such as the Korean Provisional Government from those in 
the semi-periphery including ethnic Koreans engaged in guerilla insurgency 
movements in Manchuria and those who remained on the peninsula.
48
  
Those in exile saw the decline of party divisions which reinforced ethnic 
boundaries and the rise and replacement of transnational party divisions. This saw the 
transformation of Korean and Chinese nationalists and radical nationalists’ 
movements. For instance, during this period we see the transformation of the 
Kuomintang party in China and the creation of the nationalist Korean Provisional 
Government (KPG) based in Shanghai as well as the formation of the Chinese 
Communist and the Korean Communist parties who were both nationalists and 
seeking revolution as a legitimate means to achieve their political ends. Although 
these parties were associated with a similar abstract ideology the lack of political 
integration saw the clashing perspectives and interests of the separate political elite of 
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 For example the Kuomintang often undercut the Korean Provisional 
Government by their instance of the Three People’s Policy which undermined their 
political autonomy, the refusal of military training of Koreans in the Nationalist army 
and then only giving minimal support for the KPG army at the beginning of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War which then was rescinded in 1941. Only in 1944 did 
Chiang Kai-shek see it in his interest to recognize the KPG which was in disarray and 




In the Korean semi-periphery major guerilla movements were active in 
Manchuria with as many as 200,000 Chinese and Korean guerrillas loosely connected 
in the form of irregulars, bandits and secret societies emerging in opposition to 
Japanese expansion and its creation of Manchukuo officially legislated on March 1
st
 
1932 as a provocative reference to the Korean independence movement on March 1
st
 
1919. These Korean and Chinese guerillas retained a large amount of autonomy and 
were not under the direct effective command of any military group and fought in 
highly mobile units of between 50-100 non-regulars. They did not establish permanent 
positions but attacked the Japanese through ambush then retreated through rough 
terrain or into Russia. This combination was viewed as optimal to avoid attacks or 
capture.
51
 These guerilla tactics were highly effective and dominated the police force 
destroying convoys and companies of the Kwantung Army even after the 
establishment of counter-insurgency units who eventually reduced these guerillas to a 
couple of thousand by the end of the occupation.
52
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Kim Il Sung (1912-1994) emerged from this group as a significant guerilla 
leader and even had a special counter-insurgency unit (which included Koreans as a 
divisive tactic) assigned to his capture. This resistance was the main legitimizing force 
in the formation of the North Korean state and acts as an identity base of both the 
army and its leadership. On an ethnic dimension Korean participation in the 
insurgency was higher than any other ethnic group, even the Han Chinese when 
measured as a proportion of the population.
53
 This was due in part to the material and 
other aid provided by the ethnic Korean population in areas such as in Chentiao where 
the ethnic Korean population measured in the hundreds of thousands and where the 
members the insurgency could anonymously disappear in large ethnically Korean 
communities.  
On the Korean peninsula, ethnonational movements were ideologically 
fractured between liberal, socialist or communist camps and again were divided 
between those who sought a radical approach to political autonomy and those who 
favored a gradual approach. Each ethno-national ideology had its relative benefits and 
drawbacks.
54
 While liberalism was associated with self-determination and autonomy it 
lacked material and political support from the international community whereas the 
socialist and communists had the potential to mobilize large exploited peasant 
populations they had the disadvantage of severe repression by a highly mobile and 
effective national police force. This repression saw many radical leaders imprisoned 
by the late 1920’s and early 1930’s only to emerge as cultural and political 
entrepreneurs after 1945. One example is Pak Hyon-yong who founded the Korean 
Communist Party in 1925 and reassumed its leadership after liberation.
55
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Others who favored a gradual approach included the first group of Korean 
economic entrepreneurs but as result of their participation with the Japanese severely 
stunted the development the liberal democratic elite after liberation. One group of 
these economic entrepreneurs included a number of Honam land owners who 
particularly benefited from the relaxed policies of the period of cultural rule. Members 
of this group included Kim Song-Su who founded the Kyongbang Textile Company 
after the Japanese zaibatsu model. This firm had the vertical ability to grow and 
harvest cotton, weave raw fabric and transform it into completed garments as an entire 
process. It later extended horizontally into heavy industries building machineries and 
aircraft production, extraction commodities such as metals, gold, oil and real estate. 
Kim also founded the Korean language newspaper the Tonga Ilbo and had a major 
role in founding Koryo University. Other members included Chong Yong-chol who 
invested in rubber and Kim Song-gyu, one of largest landholders in the Cholla 
provinces who founded the Kwangju Agricultural and Industrial Bank.  
In terms of politics, this group found and led Korean Democratic Party and 
after 1945, supplied many officials during the American occupation from 1945-1948 
and provided political opposition to the autocratic regimes of Syngman Rhee (1948-
1960) and Park Chung Hee (1961-1979).
56
 Not all economic entrepreneurs emerged 
from the landowning class but also from the commoner and outcaste classes. One 
example is Park Hung-sik who built a commercial and an industrial empire which 
included the Chosen Aircraft Company. While these men from different class 
backgrounds profited during the Japanese occupation and its military expansion this 
profit was viewed as made at the expense of the national group after liberation.  
While this period was marked by a less severe period of cultural rule and the 
formation of fractured nationalistic parties and elites it was also a period of economic 




stagnation. The case in Korea was a classic example of a core and peripheral 
relationship which can be understood as food security in terms of per capita rice 
consumption. In 1929 only 77 liters of rice per person was consumed Korea (down 
from in 124 liters in 1914) compared with 198 liters in Japan as millet from Manchuria 
was sent to feed Korean peasants while Korean rice was exported to Japan.
57
  
By the 1930’s Japan largely withdrew world economic system and focused on 
economic development in their contiguous territories. This marked the beginning of 
industrial growth within the extended political economy as the Japanese located heavy 
industry and infrastructure in its colonies bringing factories and plants to stores of 
cheap labor and natural resources. This was combined with massive state investment 
in an effort to bring the colonies out economic depression. Early in this 1930’s textiles 
were still the main exports but heavy industries also saw growth particularly in iron 
and steel, aluminum, chemicals and hydroelectric power which were generally located 
in Korea and Manchuria. By 1936, heavy industry accounted for 28%of total industrial 
production which again tripled by 1945.
58
 
The Japanese expansion into Manchuria and later into China and Southeast 
Asia caused labor shortages throughout the empire. This was combined with divide 
and rule tactics offered opportunities for upward social mobility for a minority of 
ethnic Korean bureaucrats, police, soldiers and entrepreneurs who would act in 
intermediate positions between a Japanese upper-class and a Chinese under-class in 
Manchuria while the majority of ethnic Koreans were mobilized as labor or in 
agricultural and moved to Japan and Manchukuo.  
The combination of industrialization and labor movements created an 
amalgamated political economy where the relationship between markets and 






production saw national boundaries become less important than the transnational 
boundaries where these goods and people circulate.
59
 It did not produce a security 
community however as it lacked key features for integration as it based on highly 
exploitative practices based on ethnic perimeters. For example in 1937, Japanese 
workers in Korea received 2 yen a day while Korean workers received .66 yen for the 
same skill sets and work responsibilities.
60
 It should not be surprising that this Korean 
and Manchurian sphere was the setting for revolt, violence and insurgency and it was 
the inability of the Kwangtung army to fully secure Manchuria and North China by 
1941 that influenced the decision to change tactics and move south. The attack at Pearl 
Harbor occurred only four months later.
61
 
The final period of rule included the Naisne Ittai or the assimilation movement 
which began in 1937 at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War. This period was 
was marked by forced assimilation and forced mobilization and was the most 
politically severe. It included the state directed requirements for ethnic Koreans to 
speak Japanese, take Japanese names, forced Emperor worship and religious 
conversion to Shinto beliefs in an attempt to forcefully assimilate ethnic Koreans and 
to eradicate Korean language and cultural forms. Japanese propaganda also linked 
Neo-Confucian and authoritarian politics in creating the Kokutai which combined the 
characters of Koku or country and tai (ch’e in Korean) or a philosophical basis. This 
legislated national identity drew contrasts between Western individualism and selfish 
material desire and the Japanese concept of musubi or a collective nationalism.
62
   
It was also a period of intense forced mobilization of ethnic Koreans starting 
with the preparations for the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. By 1942 and the 
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creation of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere massive Korean populations 
were either drafted or simply conscripted as labor. In 1940 there were 1.5 million 
ethnic Koreans in Manchuria which were either indigenous or were mobilized by the 
Japanese to farm rice. By 1941 there were 1.4 million Koreans in Japan with 770,000 
working as labor, 220,000 in construction, 208,000 in manufacturing, and 94,000 in 
mining performing the most difficult and dangerous jobs.
63
 These workers were 
subject to both ethnic and gender exploitation and discrimination and by the end of 
war ethnic Koreans made up a third of the industrial force in Japan. This mobilization 
severely disrupted the stability of provincial population distributions and saw many 
peasants lose their land who then moved to the cities to escape unemployment or to 
supplement family incomes only to be mobilized into industrial jobs or mining that 
was unsafe and unfamiliar. At this time four out of five peasants rented all or part of 
the land they worked and this tenancy was marked by insecurity, debt, usury, 
uncompensated labor and penury.
64
  
The formation of the Korean League for the General Mobilization of the 
National Spirit in 1937 saw branches at the provincial, county, town and workplace 
levels and by 1938 a corps was formed to recruit youth for military service, while the 
Korean Anti-Communist Association also had established provincial offices with 
associated organizations at the village and workplace levels as well. Anti-Communist 
propaganda became compulsory in the schools and workplaces and perhaps spoke to 
the influence of the Communists within the mass population. Ethnic Korean 
nationalists or communists who resisted were interrogated by totalitarian methods 
until they politically confessed in writing. This form of political thought reform 
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continued in both North and South Korean after the liberation and division within their 
respective police forces and intelligence agencies.
65
 
The colonial authorities established provincial quotas based on population for 
mobilization details but the selection process was highly divisive and controlled by 
local officials or police who selected labor from poor and disadvantaged clans who 
became despised for it. At this time 40-50% of the national police force was Korean 
and was used extensively in Manchukuo and especially feared as the mobile units used 
in Korean and Chinese guerilla counter-insurgencies units who employedthe lowest 
class Japanese and Korean thugs. The use of divide and rule tactics by the Japanese 
often saw the mobilization of Koreans by Koreans including between 100,000-
200,000 women who were mobilized into sexual slavery. Women also received much 
lower wages than men as labor and assumed roles in the now secondary textile 
industry as well as in mining details where they were required to work bear-breasted 
for up to 12 hour shifts.  
By 1944, 11.6 percent of all ethnic Koreans were residing outside of the 
peninsula and about 20 percent were either abroad or in provinces that they were not 
born in. This group generally consisted of 15-45 year olds meaning that as much as 40 
percent of the adult Korean population was mobilized for labor and as Japan had 
established a repressive and militaristic discipline within the factories it had a lasting 
impression on labor in both Korean states marked by militarization, the repression of 
labor and the reappearance of class and gender exploitation.
66
 
The colonial period ended abruptly in 1945 which created a vacuum as there 
was a massive withdraw of Japanese bureaucrats from Korea as well as a rapid 
withdraw of the Kwantung Army from Manchuria. This had the effect of leaving a 
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liberated Korea that could not function as a bureaucracy as well as allowing 
geopolitical foot holds for the Soviet Union and the United States who would soon to 
divide the peninsula. Many Koreans sought to return to their home villages from these 
forced mobilization details only to mix with those who selected them for mobilization 
including those in the police force producing highly fractured localities. Large 
numbers of ethnic Koreans also remained in Northern China and Japan seeing a group 
fractured along geographic, social and political criteria. This group was also 
economically polarized along class dimensions. These combinations of variables 
would soon lead to an ethnic civil war that had both regional and international 
dimensions that had devastating consequences for human lives and a tremendous 
impact on their political economy and leading to the continued political and intra-




EXPLANATIONS FOR GROUP CHANGE 
 
Until recently, standard political economy models generally associated ethnic 
groups as being relatively static entities with unchanging identities and their 
calculations of ethnic heterogeneity were favored as an econometric because these 
groups were viewed as similar to a country’s geographic location, topography or 
climate and exogenous to historical forces.
67
 This view is discounts constructivist 
theories that argue ethnic groups are dynamic entities as people assimilate, 
amalgamate or disintegrate into different cultural or language communities or 
immigrate or emigrate to different political economies.
68
 These processes are said not 
only to transform the respective ethnic demographies of a territory or country but also 
produce changes that can transform group identities.
69
 
Early constructivist work along these lines includes that of Deutsch (1954) 
who relied on macro-level or population level processes such as mobilization and 
assimilation for explaining the transformative effects on ethnic identities as the 
localized products of macro-historical forces. Changes in social, political and 
economic interactions during periods of modernization transformed relatively stable 
ethnic group identities into ethno-national identities by collective learning at the group 
level. By emphasizing the degree of to which the people communicate as a proxy for 
political community he theorized that changes in the rates and degree of mobilization 
and assimilation can change the distribution of the content associated with the ethnic 
group. The logic follows that when a wide range of different experiences are fed into a 
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similar system of social learning and communication it can change patterns interaction 
and information which produces ethnic differentiation. The dissimilar perceptions and 
experiences brought on by the pressures of assimilation and mobilization change 
patterns of group learning which in turn will differentiate a once similar community. 
National conflict results when a non-monotonic situation arises in terms of the relative 
sizes of these differentiated ethnic groups.  
While Deutsch relies on macro-level forces such as assimilation and 
mobilization to explain how changes in ethnic demographics can produce civil or 
ethno-national conflict Fearon and Laitin (2000) developed a model that suggests that 
the mechanisms involved with the construction of ethnic identities exist at the level of 
individual interaction and can be better used to explain differentiation and conflict. 
They posit a process of ethnic identity choice where the outcome of interaction 
depends on the choices of the other within an interaction. Where ethnic identities or 
categories are confirmed, reinforced or propagated within interactions they remain 
relatively stable but where common assumptions about the content of an identity are 
questioned or where changes in ethnic categories such as language or religion can lead 
to the construction of new or altered ethnic identities which in turn change cultural 
boundaries. Direct action occurs when those who have an interest in maintaining the 
previously accepted cultural boundaries conflict with those who wish to change or 
alter their ethnic identities. 
They suggest that cultural borders are far more permeable than territorial 
boundaries such as those constructed, maintained and policed by modern states as 
cultural borders can be altered by everyday acts and choices of individuals. If ether 
type of border is to be maintained there must be coordination and where there is little 
or no coordination violence can result in a number of ways but generally along two 
categories; in limiting defection or in the consolidation of power. In this schema those 
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wish to stop the defection of co-ethnics to another group may attack the members of 
their own group who have been assimilated to another ethnic group. They may also 
injure or kill members of the other ethnic group in an attempt to elicit punitive 
retributions which would act to re-polarize the groups. Another way violence is 
exercised within this model is through the consolidation of power. Those who 
systematically emphasize the historically constructed prototypical group boundaries 
over the real and altered cultural boundaries of the group can enlist thugs or non-
regulars to threaten or attack ethnic moderates who then must return to the leader who 
ordered the attacks for protection and works to consolidate their ethnic power base.  
These explanations seem to reflect elite reactions to efforts of non-elites to 
change re-define or cross ethnic boundaries. If these explanations of ethnic violence 
lie in the strategic behavior of ethnic elites they explain why non-elites follow at such 
a high cost to their personal security and damage to their political economy. A 
potential answer is that the mass public is not duped by the elites but rather acts on 
interests and motivations at the local level such as personal revenge or the economic 
gains from looting or land grabs. In these cases, ethnic elites utilize these localized 
motives for their own political ends. 
There seems to be evidence for both macro and micro-level explanations above 
from the narrative but seem diametrically opposed in terms of causality. While 
Deutsch suggests that the agency involved in the construction of ethnic identities lies 
at the population level. Population and cultural dynamics produce changes in 
experiences which then lead individuals to psychologically construct their ethnic 
identities locally. In short the causal mechanism relates how demographic or cultural 
change results in identity change. Fearon and Laitin contend that agency lies at the 
individual level where people interdependently determine their ethnic identities and 
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their associated categories and when contested can lead to changed identities and 
shifting cultural borders and changing ethnic demographies.  
The examination of the Korean case is interesting in terms of the rapid changes 
in ethnic demographics brought on by changes in the political boundaries of Korea 
starting in 1910 with its annexation and the attempt of the Japanese to amalgamate, 
assimilate and homogenize the Korean population. These boundaries again were 
changed with Korean liberation and changed again shortly these after a new political 
boundary divided the peninsula territorially and the resulting ethnic cleavage. 
Likewise the Korean case saw forced assimilation and mobilization and argued along 
Deutsch’s lines changed the individual perceptions and experiences which then led to 
local antipathies. This could be argued to result in civil conflict as it polarized many 
localities along the same dimensions throughout the peninsula leading to differentiated 
ethnic identities. 
An argument along Fearon and Laitin’s lines follows that the individuals on 
the ground in each of the localities through a process of identity selection determined 
whether or not to defect. These individual decisions to cooperate with the Japanese to 
ethnically defect or switch would be countered by those who wished the ethnic borders 
to remain along the prototypical dimensions and particular content associated within 
these ethnic identity borders. In this way the selection of ethnic identities as the 
aggregate choices at the local level in turn changed ethnic demographics and cultural 
borders.  
Identity change and cultural change however are not equivalent concepts as 
identity change happens at the individual level and cultural change happens at the 
level of the population. However, it does suggest there is a theoretical need to examine 
the structure of ethnic identity and cultural boundaries to better conceive of their 
relationship. The same set of distinctions between the micro and macro-levels in terms 
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cultural structure can be typed as common and collective boundaries and both have 




The common set of boundaries is constructed from shared beliefs and 
knowledge within the group perimeters. These shared beliefs do not need to be true 
but only believed to be true and changes in these beliefs or action by actors through 
contestation is reducible to changes the structure and distribution of one set of cultural 
borders along the lines that Fearon and Laitin suggest in their model, that is at the 
common set. There is a second set of cultural borders at the macro or the collective 
level that supervenes on, but is not reducible to changes in individual belief.
71
 That is 
that the common set of borders is foundational to a collective set but they are not 
reducible to changes in belief because many different combinations of changes at the 
micro-level can reach the same macro-level state. This suggests a different of causal 
mechanisms apart from those at the individual level of identity selection.   
While collective patterns can be realized in a number of ways, as an ideational 
structure it can not have effects apart from at least substratum of group belief. This 
permits the potential for a group belief to exist that no individual of the group may 
hold personally and as such collective structures can help explain patterns in aggregate 
behavior.
72
 We can think of the mechanisms at the individual level of interaction 
generating auto-dynamic processes at the level of the population. These processes 
result in positive or negative feedback effects that can lead to upward or downward 
spirals or cyclical fluctuations of certain phenomena such as conflict or economic 
growth or another dynamic characterized as having threshold effects where numbers of 
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mobilized individuals must reach a certain minimum before others more resistant to 
mobilization will also act. The aggregate results in these cases are the results of 
individual choices, driven at the individual level but themselves are not necessarily the 
object of any individual purposive choice and again have effects that are only 
discernable at the level of the population.
73
  
As the casual mechanism at the individual level is interdependent these 
identities are stabilized by cultural equilibriums where their pattern of speech and 
behavior are both optimal and not disconfirmed and as mentioned above requires 
coordination. Where identity coordination is absent individuals lose commitment to 
their identities and contest core group assumptions. This leads to the formation of new 
or altered identities and a potential change in the common set of borders and can be 
observed in changes of patterns of speech and behavior.
74
 
The causal mechanism at the population level is evolutionary and contains 
three constitutive criteria. It explains the movement of a variable over time and in this 
case it is a trait which is ethnic identity and as discussed earlier includes rules of 
membership and sets of ethnic categories and their content or meanings for the group. 
It must also specify a means of generating variation in the dependent variable 
which are interaction differentials for winnowing the effects of that variation, in this 
case cultural selection. Finally, it must explain the inertial tendencies that stabilize 
these changes in a population. This is the group’s commitment to their learned 
identities reinforced by institutional structures.
75
 These institutional structures are so 
evident in the contingent cultural traits of prototypical ethnic groups their homeostatic 
stability causes ethnic groups to be understood through their prototypical institutions. 
Changes in these institutional structures such as enforcing ethnic discrimination and 
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exploitation such as in the Korean case, may give certain individuals in certain 
situations reason to try to pass as an ethnic other.  
The mechanism at work at the collective level is cultural selection rather than 
interdependent identity selection. Cultural selection is an active and intentional 
process that involves diffusion of behavior and speech between individuals through 
successive generations and involves both imitation as well as learning. While imitation 
may lack internalization learning does not and can be categorized as either simple or 
complex learning. Whereas simple learning is used by groups to adapt their behavior 
within a particular environment complex learning allows the group to modify its inner 
structure on basis on new casual knowledge which is not reducible to changes in belief 
at the individual level.
76
 
As this learning is collective it refers to group rather than individual learning 
processes. Important distinctions can be made between the two in terms of the 
processing speeds of information, the ability to recall memories, and recombine these 
elements into new forms and interpretations. An individual as a member of a group 
has a tremendous capacity in terms speed processing and recombination of patterns of 
information while groups process information very slowly within very limited ranges 
but can gather and store large amounts of information and data. Groups also have 
longer memories which are coded by language and is stored both cognitively and 
physically allowing its memory to surpass generations of individuals.
77
  
Complex learning is an explanation of how collective representations can form 
in groups including collective identities. It is from these stores of group knowledge as 
well as patterning perceived from the wider environment that individuals as members 
of ethnic or other collective groups select from and ascribe to themselves and others 
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and as such exists at both the individual and group levels. The common set of borders 
constructing a group’s identity and the collective set of cultural borders are mutually 
constitutive and a change in one will imply a change in the other but this relationship 
is not reductive.  
Any one individual may change their identity by a change in belief but this will 
not necessarily produce a change at the macro or collective level. There must also be a 
threshold effect relative to the frequency and distribution of other individuals in the 
group to produce a change in the collective distribution and a change in that particular 
sub-stratum of belief.
78
 Changes in these collective borders are dependant on the 
frequency of changes within the aggregate population and not just changes in belief or 
practices of any one ethnic individual. Collective structures can be used as resource 
for mobilizing collective or group action even if forgotten at any one moment and 
once created has long term effects.
79
 
It follows that if the interaction behavior is known at the micro-level the 
question becomes what patterns, distribution of outcomes or statistical regularizes at 
the macro-level are more probable to emerge given the variables.
80
 This is somewhat 
different from modeling from the macro-level to the micro-level where it is assumed 
the laws governing key macro-relationships such as assimilation or mobilization are 
known and from these assumptions researchers hypothesize about what changes of 
specific events at the micro-level can occur and are generally based on linear algebra, 
assumptions about equilibriums, and the conversion of aggregated values for 
interacting variables into system end-states.
81
 Top-down approaches are generally not 
sensitive to the complexity of agent-level interactions whereas bottom-up approaches 
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can expose agent level complexity and the related effects if simulated in producing 
patterns, behaviors, processes and higher order mechanisms as developing from 
individual level interactions.
82
 It is the interaction between these two levels or between 
these two sets of borders that perhaps links the opposing arrows within both Deutsch’s 
and Fearon and Laitin’s explanations above explaining ethnic identity change and its 
effects on political outcomes such conflict or economic growth.  
Perhaps a useful technology to deal with this complexity between the micro 
and macro-levels is the Agent-Based-Identity-Repertoire developed by Lustick (2002). 
Consider a three by three grid consisting of 9 squares altogether and within each 
square is an individual with a particular identity and language repertoire. In the center 
square is a central agent who has a neighbor on each side and on each corner for a 
total of eight neighbors’ altogether. The components of the identity or language 
repertoire of any agent at any one time (t) is considered either latent or active and each 
actor is assigned a particular weight (1) that reflects the actors localized influence on 
others. Particular agents are marked as political or cultural entrepreneurs and have a 
higher weight (2) than a regular agent. All the potential identities of the agents are 
scaled for identity or language bias by the level of attractiveness (or unattractiveness) 
of any one identity due to exogenous pressures from the environment of the agents and 
are determined and applied before computation. 
Within a time frame of t, within the localized parameters or neighborhood each 
identity within that area is calculated by combining the number of agents activated per 
identity, the positive or negative external bias values as well as changes brought on by 
the number and distribution of political entrepreneurs at the local level. The resulting 
identity weights give the central actor a perception of its localized environment and 
the agent will select from its repertoire the highest weighted language or identity 




available at that time which would be his or her optimal choice. These patterns can be 
mapped statistically with the use of a measure of ethnic or linguistic fractionalization 
or polarization. This model is particularly useful to see the intended and unintended 
effects of actor interaction on the level of the population. As these identity or language 
repertoires are assigned by the researcher to correlate with specific regions or areas 
one would not necessarily be limited by the wide-spread lack of large n-data sets for 
language repertoires or subject to the large cost it would incur to collect this data.  
Any problems with coding schema could be built into the data set depending 
on the researchers’ needs or particular theory as individuals have complex language 
and identity repertories and can be disaggregated along different dimensions and can 
be applied according to the situation. Consider an ethnic Korean identity with codable 
sub-groups in China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan. At any time an individual 
could identify as an ethnic Korean, as a regional variant such as a South or North 
Korean for example and in cases of inter-marriage or through assimilation any 
individual could have the potential to adopt other ethnic identities as well. These 
disaggregated ethnic sub-groups can be assumed to differ in their content areas and 
along particular ethnic categories as well.  
For experimental purposes these repertoires and distributions of entrepreneurs 
as well as external levels of bias can be configured in a number of ways within the 
model described above to see what outcomes emerge at the macro-level. Applications 
such as these would be helpful in determining how micro-level interactions and 
identity selection may produce particular effects at the macro-level however it is not 
meant to discredit population explanations which from the earlier discussion of theory 
is an open question. This is suggested to aid macro-level theories rather than dismiss 
these approaches particularly in determining external positive or negative bias. Tests 
such as the one suggested above requires a measure of either ethnic or linguistic 
 41 
fractionalization or polarization or other measures of ethnic, linguistic or religious 




MEASURES OF ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY AND DISTANCE 
 
Two concepts are important relative to statistical measures of ethnic 
demographies when considering the homogeneity or heterogeneity of population 
structures; the degree of fracture and the degree of polarity. The degree of fracture 
would measure the number of ethnic groups or groups along a particular ethnic 
category within a particular population or geographic area. Polarity would see the 
formation of two opposing groups that are becoming more distant over ethnic 
categories and hence polarized along one or multiple dimensions.  
The degree of ethnic fracture or fractionalization have been used widely in 
econometrics (Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al 2003) which uses an inverse of 
the Herfindahl index number of ethnic groups or groups along an ethnic category 
within a particular country.
83
 The measure reflects the probability that two members of 
a population are chosen at random are from different ethnic groups, speak different 
languages or are from different religious groups. A basic problem with this measure of 
fracture is the problem of endogeneity. This would occur where a group where 
individuals who once categorized themselves speakers of two dialects of the same 
language later re-categorize their speech forms as separate languages without making 
any changes in actual speech patterns.   
Until recently researchers developed cross-national estimates of ethnic 
heterogeneity using the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Indices (ELF indices) data 
set developed by Soviet ethnographers in the 1960‟s. The theoretical assumption was 
that ethnic groups were static and were naturally antipathetic and while the 
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ethnographic data reflected linguistic groupings it did not reflect other ethnic 
categories such as skin pigmentation, somatic or other physical features or differences 
in religion which can emerge as politically salient cleavages. This is further 
complicated in that ethnic categories have multiple levels and relative to the ELF data 
would see the same groups disaggregated by dialectical or sub-dialectical boundaries. 
Finally, measures of fracture do not account for the spatial distributions of these 
groups in geographic space or relates any information of how different the speech 
forms are from each other.
84
  
Relative to changes in changes in group sizes Roeder (2002) developed and 
compared measures of ethnolinguistic fracture in the years 1961 and 1985 based on 
ELF data. It benefits from the use the same coding criteria for each year to delineate 
groups and reflects changes in number and sizes of ethnolinguistic groups rather than 
groups defined along another ethnic category. The correlations between 2 years is very 
strong (r= 0.96) and this is reflected in comparisons with Japan (0.015/ 0.014), North 
Korea (0.004/ 0.004), South Korea (0.003/0.003) and China (0.118/ 0.131) all 
reflecting a similar degree of linguistic homogeneity in each of these countries in 1964 
and in 1985. However if data was available in this region between the years 1850 to 
1950 as discussed in the narrative one would see many differentials in the ethnic 
demographies in this region due to the processes described in the narrative particularly 
in Korea after 1936. An important consideration is the sources of the specific rates of 
change which are variable and their effects on political outcomes such as conflict or 
economic growth.  
Relative to the multiplicity of ethnic categories Alesina et al (2003) produced 
lists of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups for 190 countries and used them to 
construct measures of fractionalization. Along ethnic, linguistic and religious 
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dimensions Japan measured (0.012/ 0.018/ 0.541) with North Korea (0.039/ 0.003/ 
0.489) South Korea (0.002/ 0.002/ 0.660) and China (0.154/ 0.133/ 0.664) 
respectively. Similarly Fearon (2003) constructed a list of 822 ethnic groups in 160 
countries that make up at least one percent of a countries population and used it to 
construct a measure of ethnic fractionalization. He also developed an index of cultural 
fractionalization that uses the structural distance between languages as a proxy for the 
cultural distance between groups. Here Japan measured (0.012/ 0.012), North Korea 
(0.002/ 0.002), South Korea (0.002/ 0.002) and China (0.154/ 0.154) respectively 
relative to ethnic and cultural fractionalization. 
The statistical measure of fractionalization above was the first of three 
statistical measures of the boundaries of a language community developed by 
Greenberg (1956) and later developed by Laitin (2000). Greenberg developed a 
second index of fractionalization that is weighted by a degree of linguistic distance 
between the speech patterns of different groups.
85
 His original concept of included a 
measure of pronunciation distance by use of lexico-statistics and sought to calculate 
actual rather than the historic distance between speech forms. This technology 
however had never been developed. He mistakenly suggested the use of a 
glottochronology list which added a number of conceptual problems to its 
development. For instance a glottochronology list relied on written words which can 
be quite different from speech patterns and there are no general criteria to determine 
how far pronunciations needed to be to be coded as different words on a list. This 
measure of linguistic distance could also change relative to possible synonyms for any 
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Fearon (2003) used this measure that relies on estimations of the chronological 
distance between the prototypical languages of the ethnic groups within each country 
to construct the measure of cultural fracture above. This data was developed by Fearon 
and Laitin (1999, 2000) and Laitin (2000) who used linguistic data from Ethnolouge 
that classifies languages by structure and the use of dendrograms. Linguists classify 
languages by counting branch points on these tree diagrams linking language families, 
language groups and languages down to sub-dialects. The higher the number of shared 
points on the tree means the greater amount of linguistic similarity between the 
languages compared. This measure however discounts periods of acculturation 
between groups measurable by diffusion of loanwords which are shared by members 
of different speech communities and usually can be traceable to a particular language 
and a point of origin as per the examples in the narrative however this measure has a 
naturally intuitive quality as the historical divergence of groups and the diachronic 
distance of the languages they speak, particularly where the name of the ethnic group 
is the same as the language the group speaks.   
Greenberg’s third index is a multilingual measure of language community 
where individuals are not considered by their first language or the proximity of first 
languages but their full language repertoires.
87
 It reflects the probability that if two 
people were chosen at random would have at least one language in common. While 
this example sees the multiplicity of an ethnic category represented by complex 
language repertoires it could easily be adjust to reflect the multiplicity of identity 
repertoires as well.  
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While particularly useful, there are a number of problems with the application 
of this measure as there is an absence of any reliable data sets or sources of cross-
country measures of multilingualism and measuring language by the use of survey is 
problematic as it produces bias as respondents systematically misreport their language 
behavior to those who question them about it.
88
 For instance, the criteria people use to 
determine whether they speak another language are quite different across populations 
and across languages within a population. Another problem is that the wordings of 
questions on cross-national surveys can give different signals to the respondents.
89
 
Terms such as mother tongue are variable across contexts as well as the criteria people 
use to denote their degree of fluency and this is compounded and as there is no way to 
calibrate the connotation of these terms in a survey instrument across languages.
90
  
Laitin (2000a) suggests the development of a number of techniques to counter 
cross-national survey bias in the development of complementary ethnographic reports 
on sub-samples of the surveyed population. Here participant observation techniques 
could be used to assess the direction and magnitude of bias allowing for correction 
parameters. Another more intensive technique would be to develop stratified samples 
of country populations and use standard second or third language testing techniques 
that are designed to measure achievement and an even more intensive technique would 
entail the development of linguistic background scales where trained interviewers 
would be able to assess language skills, language relative to social functions as well as 
intergenerational patterns of maintenance. These tests could be combined with 
ethnographic data in the observation of random interactions in a variety of domains in 
a multilingual situation to see what patterns and speeds of adjustment multilingual 
speakers engage in regular discourse.  
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The development of surveys could also be developed in measuring the ethnic 
identity repertoires of various populations where individuals could be asked to list the 
ethnic groups in their country or region, ask them to self-report what groups they are 
members of and to list them by rank order as well as what ethnic groups most others in 
the region would label them as members. If taken over time it could changes in the 
situational saliency of a particular element of their identity repertoire as well as a 
degree to which ethnicity is subjectively applied and the degree that it is 
intersubjectively by others throughout the population.
91
 These methods developed and 
applied systematically would be quite expensive and as information of this kind can be 
politically combustible and many governments or countries do not collect 
ethnographic data of this sort and thus the complexity of language or identity 
repertories cross-nationally are not currently expressed statistically.
92
 While these 
surveys offer applications for potential empirical research, the conceptual basis of this 
multiplicity of language and identity repertoires could be applied to computational and 
virtual analysis along the lines of Agent-Based-Identity-Repertoire developed by 
Lustick (2002) mentioned above.  
The measurement of ethnic polarization also requires a measure of ethnic 
distance as it reflects patterns of assimilation or dissimilation along a particular ethnic 
category in the creation of two differentiated groups.  
Polarity is expressed formally as; 
          n   n      ¹+α 
P (s,y) = K Σ Σ si  sj | yi – yj | 
   i=1 j=1 
A measure of ethnic distance could also be applied to a measure of polarization 
and is reflected in the analog of | yi – yj | in the equation above. While measures of 
ethnic, linguistic or religious fracture have been utilized in explanations of economic 
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growth or its absence newer measures of polarization have been applied to ethnic and 
civil conflict. For instance Montalvo and Reyna-Querol (2002) found that civil wars 
are better predicted by this measure of polarity than of ethnic fractionalization when 
using diachronic linguistic distance as proxy for cultural distance (i.e. Fearon 2003) 
and this was also supported by the findings of Alesina et.al. (2003). Overall, the 
measurement of ethnic distance is underdeveloped within the literature and is reflected 
in its limited application at the macro-level particularly when considering the amount 
of work on group size.
93
  
While ethnic distance at the level of population would consider the cultural or 
linguistic range within a particular ethnic community or the cultural or linguistic 
variation between particular ethnic or language communities ethnic distance 
supervenes at the individual level as the cost of determining or locating ethnic 
members or determining non-ethnic members. Similarly, changing or switching 
identities can be difficult and expensive and in many cases depend on different 
criteria. In this light, in order to pass as an ethnic other this distance must be bridged.  
Many micro-level theories of political interaction including Fearon and Laitin’s 
example above at least implicitly assume that ethnic individuals can readily 
distinguish in-group from out-group ethnic members. Others include the policing 
ethnic or cultural boundaries (Barth 1969; Laitin 1995; Fearon 1999; Caselli and 
Coleman 2002), in-group sanctioning (Greif 1989; Landa 1994; Fearon and Laitin 
1996), theories of ethnic and racial discrimination (Akerlof 1970; Becker 1971) and 
experimental models of intergroup behavior within social psychology (Tajfel, Billig 
and Bundy 1971).  
This assumption becomes problematic when considering recent experimental 
data from Habyarimana et.al (2004) which disconfirms this assumption. They tested 
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the ability of respondents to correctly identify ethnic backgrounds of others using 
three levels of information and found that 30% of respondents were unable to correctly 
identify ethnic backgrounds of other individuals. They also found variation across 
ethnic groups and across co-ethnic and non-ethnic parings. They also found that 
members of some groups were better able to pass than others when given economic 
incentives and also found that group specific criteria is much more important than 
individual level criteria such as personal experience and intelligence.  
Caselli and Coleman (2002) suggest that not all ethnic categories are equal 
when it comes to ethnic identification as certain categories such as skin color, somatic 
or other physical features are more effective cues than non-physical traits. Differences 
in religion or languages can be discernable by cues or exchanges in information while 
categories that are marked only by identity or history less any other cues are the least 
effective in distinguishing ethnic and non-ethnic members. It would seem that 
measures of racial distance would have many conceptual problems particularly in the 
definition and measurement of the distinguishing physiological characteristics. While 
Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2004) and Spolaore and Waczairg (2005) explore the 
economic consequences of genetic distance within populations by measuring the 
frequency of alleles in various populations, genetic distance is not the same as ethnic 
distance as genetic distance does not usually lead to phenotypic or visible differences 
between groups.  
By what criteria and to what degree to which ethnic members can distinguish 
both members and non-members is an empirical question. Perhaps where categories as 
somatic or physiognomic traits or skin color may be less reliable as ethnic identifiers, 
linguistic or cultural cues become very important in distinguishing ethnic group 
members.
94
 The historical saliency of language as an ethnic category in this 
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geographical region in delineating ethnic populations as collectives and at the 
individual level as an identifier to a particular geographic and cultural location lends 
credence to the development of a technology to measure linguistic distance that can be 
applied to both levels of analysis. 
Advances in computational linguistics, particularly in dialectometry use 
measures of pronunciation distance to classify and delineate speech forms. Spoken 
words or sentences are first recorded and transcribed into a phonetic alphabet, such as 
International Phonetic Alphabet and the algorithm then is used to produce a numerical 
value by counting the changes in transforming one string of morphemes into another 
by counting the cost of the least expensive set if insertions, deletions or substitutions 
in their sequential structure.
95
 As the value is numeric it is additive it allows the sum 
of atomic difference to be aggregated over many pairs of similar concepts.
96
 
Aggregate characterizations are often elusive as large data sets invariably contain 
counter-indicating tendencies, which becomes analytically challenging without 
selecting for particular linguistic features.  
The Levenshtein distance is a very sensitive measure used to measure 
dialectical distance and can be applied in two separate techniques. The simplest is the 
phone string comparison. In this approach, all operations have the same cost. When 
two phones are basically equal but have different diacritics (a) v. (ä), the pair is 
regarded as different phones, for example (a) v. (ä) costs 1 unit as (a) v. (p) costs one 
unit.
97
 It is not possible with the phone string comparison to take into account the non-
equal similarity, say in regarding the pair (b, p) with that of (a, p) as more similar.  
This problem can be addressed by replacing each phone with by a bundle of 
features or a range of feature values. For each of the corresponding features, a value is 
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given which indicates to what extent that property is instantiated. Since diacritics 
influence feature values, they also affect the mapping from transcriptions into feature 
distributions and automatically figure in calculations of phonetic distance.
98
  
This metric is the feature string comparison. As longer forms tend to be 
separated by more distance than shorter words, each pair is normalized by dividing it 
to the mean lengths of any two pairs. The result is a half-matrix of distances which 
clustering is used to classify language forms.
99
 This reflects a word as a linguistic unit 
based on pronunciation distance between two speech forms and the production of a 
numeric value which can be aggregated over many individual pairs. 
In the example below, the Levenshtein distance in its most basic variant is used 
to calculate the cost of changing one form into another using insertions, deletions and 
substitutions. This distance (s¹, s²) is calculated by adding the sums of the costs of the 
cheapest set in changing s¹ to s². In the example below the Levenshtein distance is 
used to transform the Standard American saw a girl to the Bostonian pronunciation. 
The Bostonian pronunciation inserts an (r) between saw and a, deletes the postvocalic 
(r) in girl and replaces the short vowel in girl with a front rounded vowel (ø).  
 
The calculation of a single measure of pronunciation distance follows; 
scəgIrl  delete r- 1 
scəgIl  replace I/ø 2 
scəgøl  insert r  1 
scrəəgøl  
This results in the sum distance of 4 and can be considered one calculation of 
distance and while this example relates the distance between two dialects of American 
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English, this distance could be calculated between any two forms produce a numeric 
distance based on differences in pronunciation.
100
 
The traditional method of analyzing language variation is the construction of 
isoglosses, or lines dividing features on a map are problematic as they do not always 
overlap and so do not define dialectical areas. They can be parallel, bundle or cross 
describing binary divisions, however, in practice well-known isoglosses are selected 
for which form bundles which makes the method subjective.
101
 The isogloss method is 
not additive as words are selected to develop satisfactory borders while the 
Levenshtein distance is additive allowing the relationship of entire varieties to be 
aggregated by the atomic differences between forms.
102
 This recalculation speaks to a 
more sophisticated conception of language borders than do the production of 
isoglosses.  
This measure is also very precise and while this shows a linguistic distance 
based on the distance between the pronunciation of morphemes, it may be possible to 
develop similar numeric distances applicable to syntactic or possibility semantic 
distances however until these methods are developed then the application is somewhat 
limited to a particular language and its related dialects. Previous measurements have 
relied on data where 100 to 150 sentences in a particular language or dialect are 
recorded and transcribed to into phonetic script. From these sentences words 100 to 
150 words are approximately chosen to represent a wide range of sounds within the 
varieties and as this data can be aggregated multiple synonyms could be used relative 
to the construction of a particular list. 
Other techniques include the reading aloud of a translation of the same text for 
different languages, dialects or topolects and transcribed into IPA form word for word. 
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This would perhaps reflect less natural speech where there are differences in syntax 
but it guarantees a full range of words is used. This method does not use a word list 
but sentences and as such would appear in the same context from the original language 




At the macro-level this measure of distance can be applied to the Greenberg’s 
second indicator of measuring linguistic diversity and could be used as a proxy to the 
degree which monolingual individuals within a polity can communicate across a 
speech form akin to Deutsch’s hypothesis of national or ethnic community along this 
dimension mentioned above. At the individual level this distance would provide a 
comparative tool to help determine the distance between two dialects or other speech 
forms and would reflect the distance that an individual would need to traverse to pass 
as a speaker of another dialect or language. This measure could be applied in 
experimental work in ethnic identification along the lines of Habyarimana et.al. (2004) 
and could also be applied to formal modeling along the lines of Caselli and Coleman 
(2002) to map micro-level explanations of the transition from exploitation to violent 
conflict. These and other applications relative to testing will be examined relative to 
the current ethnic demographies and groups in northeast Asia in the following section.
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APPLICATIONS IN THE REGION 
 
At the population level the use of linguistic distance could be applied to the 
statistical model measuring language diversity developed by Greenberg (1954). This 
would measure the degree of linguistic fracture of a particular group weighted by a 
measure of linguistic distance such as the one suggested above. While the standard 
measure of fractionalization changes when a speech form or ethnic cleavage is re-
categorized this measure would be able to account for relative similarities and 
differences in the speech patterns and as such would weigh population level fracture 
by calculating the degree of distance between categories and is sensitive enough to 
detect linguistic differentiation.  
For instance in the Korean case this measure could be used to test the 
pronunciation distances between the major Korean dialectical forms including the 
Hamgyong-do, P’yong’an-do and Hwanghae-do dialects in North Korea, the Seoul, 
Ch’ungchong-do, Kyongsang-do, Cholla-do and Cheju-do dialects in South Korea as 
well as the pronunciation distance of ethnic Koreans in China in the Yanbian Korean 
Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province in China as well as ethnic Koreans near the 
Osaka area in Japan. The index accounts for the relative population shares of these 
sub-groups and as such would provide an overall range of distance with the speech 
form and could provide the empirical data which could serve as the theoretical basis as 
a measure of ethnic complementarity.
104
  
The Chinese case would prove more complex. As the Han ethno-national 
group the measurements of the number of speakers of each of the Chinese languages 
                                                 
104
 Deutsch (1954) 
 55 
could be compared that would include speakers of Mandarin, Gan, Hakka, Huizhou, 
Jinyu,, Min Bei, Min Dong, Min Nan, Min Zhong, Pu-Xian, Wu and Xiang as first 
languages. A measure of linguistic distance between these languages could be used to 
determine the range of communication of these languages if they were only speakers 
of their first language. As Mandarin also exists as the language regime of the Chinese 
state a measure of pronunciation distance across Mandarin including the Northern, 
Northwestern, Southwestern, Lower Yangtze and Putonghua topolects could be 
attempted and would reflect the range of communicative possibilities by those in the 
current Chinese language regime. Here the lack of accurate information and 
conceptual problems with measuring multilingualism in terms of numbers or of 
relative command of second or third languages hampers other developments such as 
measuring cross-ethnic numbers of Mandarin speakers throughout China as a proxy 
for national community. For the meantime these numbers and the degree of fluency 
must be estimated or assumed.  
Ethnic distance at the level of individual interaction can be considered the 
criteria that individuals use to judge in-group from out-group members. While perhaps 
physical ethnic categories such as skin color, somatic or other physical features are 
more effective cues in distinguishing members of ethnic in-groups and out-groups in 
certain situations physical characteristics can not be used to readily distinguish 
different groups from each other and perhaps language or other cultural criteria may 
be more salient.  
The salience of ethnic or ethno-national languages in Northeast Asia as 
reflected in the narrative offers an interesting application for the representation of 
micro-level models in terms of the identification of ethnic in-group and out-group 
members by language criteria. The constitutive aspect of membership of the Han 
ethno-national group included membership in any of the Chinese speech communities 
 56 
and is such an amalgamation of speakers of different Sinitic languages. This offered 
individuals who wished to gain mobility options to enter a national language 
community by learning Mandarin without necessarily changing the individuals’ 
membership and in extension the population numbers of each Sinitic speech 
community. Passing as Han Chinese, less any other physical characteristics (such as 
with the assimilated Hui group) or localized information would either require one to 
pass as a speaker of any one of the Chinese languages including Mandarin even as a 
second language.  
The designation of a supra-dialect as a national language meant that a de-
centralized language was implemented that members of these different Sinitic speech 
communities could employ relative to the social, political and economic institutions of 
the state. This de-centralization of a language form is structurally similar to the role of 
Literary Sinitic during the dynastic period. Passing in this sense, would be in entering 
the new national language community.  
Other major groups such as the Manchu and Hui were assimilated into this 
national language group but remain as minority ethnic groups in China while other 
such as the Koreans and Mongolians to a certain extent have been able to maintain 
their prototypical language but to certain extents linguistic capital is generated which 
can act to supply upward mobility and opportunities. Other than the Hui group, which 
is marked by significant physical differences with the other groups in northeast China 
the ability to pass as Han Chinese would not only involve linguistically assimilating to 
the majority group but also potentially moving to a new area where there would be 
less local knowledge of an individual’s descent and the costs affiliated with trying or 
attempting to pass or switch identities less any other cues.  
The Korean case under the Japanese is also interesting relative to their attempt 
at forced assimilation but differs from the Chinese case along a number of dimensions. 
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While at the local level in China entrance into the national language community did 
not necessarily change the population distributions of each Chinese language group 
save the Mandarin group and the emergence of an ethno-national group. This is 
different from the Korean situation during Japanese rule as they were required to enter 
a foreign language regime while also being subjugated to economic exploitation and 
discrimination. This acted to create ascriptive barriers to upward mobility along ethnic 
lines while also giving any ethnic Japanese a comparative advantage within the 
domain which were compounded by state institutions.  
The active physical mobilization of the Koreans also fractured localized 
communities and was again compounded by active discrimination and exploitation 
along ethnic boundaries particularly by the last period of rule starting in 1937 which 
also saw a growing minority eligible for intermediate positions within Korea and 
Manchuria and was coupled with ethnic Koreans requiring to speak only Japanese, 
take Japanese names and to religiously convert removing cues that were once used to 
recognize Korean ethnics. These forced assimilation tactics removed secondary 
features such language, names and religion and would make them discernable as 
ethnic others less any physical features used to distinguish one group from another. 
The effects of wide-spread mobilization worked to disrupt localized knowledge bases 
and could act to offer incentives for ethnic Koreans to in-effect more easily pass as 
Japanese and change identities by reducing costs to a defector. Those Koreans who 
differentiated themselves as ethnic Koreans this period were coercively dealt with by 
the authorities. The individual decision to decide to defect or not to defect was 
complicated by external forces after the Japanese defeat in 1945 when many returned 
to their local areas polarized and fractured with the associated psychic and economic 
costs. Exploitation is expensive for the dominant group as well and the assimilation 
strategy enacted to increase defection by reducing the costs in entering the Japanese 
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group as well as increasing access to ethnic Korean human capital and were used in 
intermediate positions as described in the narrative.  
One important similarity in both of these cases is that the processes underlying 
ethnic identity construction inherently occur with the group’s boundaries because 
these ethnic traits, rules and meanings are ultimately defined by individuals within the 
group but the Korean case particularly shows that these processes did not occur in a 
political void. 
While these aspects and processes consider the importance of language data in 
recognizing ethnic in-group members from out-group members the sensitivity of the 
Levenshtein distance could also be applied to situations of intra-ethnic location by 
recognition of a certain regional variation. As far as speech forms are associated with 
populations within a particular area this measure of linguistic distance is also 
isomorphic to geographic distance. An interesting application is the current Korean 
situation where the ethnolinguistic perimeters of the group span four states but is 
divided by political borders with different densities, rates and directions of movements 
and interactions between these  sub-groups and territories. This is coupled with the 
generalization that dialectical border generally align with provincial borders in North 
and South Korea or the areas within China and Japan and shows an isomorphic 
relationship between dialectical and geographical distance in terms of identification of 
an individual’s region or ability to pass as being from another region. An example 
follows. 
The economic incentive for ethnic Koreans in China to find employment in 
South Korea generally as labor have increased significantly in the last decade. While 
this work is often dangerous and dirty the wages they receive are much higher than 
those in China but again are very low in scale relative to the economy in South 
Korean. It is a mutually beneficial system particularly when considering these ethnic 
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Koreans can return to China with new technical and other skills and increases their 
human capital. It also benefits South Korean managers who can communicate with 
these workers in Korean and is much easier than with foreign workers from the 
developing world that are used as labor as many South Koreans refuse to do this work. 
This differs from the economic refugees from North Korea that have arrived in South 
Korea via China who also are at a disadvantage relative to their cultural and linguistic 
capital within the modern South Korean political economy but unlike the group from 
China can not return with new skills or innovations to North Korea and have had 
difficulties finding employment due to inadequacies in their relative cultural and 
linguistic capital.  
In both of these cases, many times these ethnic Koreans from North Korea and 
China are recognized by dialectical differences or by other cultural criteria. Their 
ability to pass as a South Korean would depend on their ability to adapt their language 
within everyday interactions and try to generate cultural and linguistic capital that is to 
assimilate to a sub-regional but national group. A measurement of linguistic distance 
as suggested above could provide a numeric cost of changing dialects as a first step 
but would also require data on any institutional barriers placed on non-South Koreans 
relative to ascriptive barriers to upward mobility and potential economic exploitation. 
Situations such as these should be considered relative to any attempts to politically 
integrate the two Korean states on the peninsula as a new political economy develops. 
These distances could also be applied along another dimension relative to the 
large ethnic Korean populations in both China and in Japan. The ability for individuals 
from these two groups to pass as Chinese or Japanese ethnics may very well depend 
their language abilities in a local Sinitic topolect, Mandarin or Japanese and other 
criteria such as taking Chinese or Japanese names. The pronunciation distance of their 
speech in Chinese or Japanese could be calculated and could represent a major cost 
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that these individuals must breech to either assimilate or to pass. This measure would 
determine to what costs a relative degree that pronunciation distances would incur 
relative to their respective fluency in Japanese and Chinese rather than Korean.  
The measurement of these pronunciation distances could be combined with 
experimental methods along the lines of Habyarimana et.al (2004). Along the first 
dimension headshots of ethnic Koreans from each region, a video greeting and a video 
greeting with the respondent stating their name could be produced and could be 
viewed by ethnic Koreans from each dialectical and geographic region and from these 
greetings respondents from these same groups could be tested to see if they could 
recognize or locate individuals by their patterns of speech. This would include a 
number who are trying to pass as a member of another sub-group by making changes 
within their dialects. The measures of linguistic distance would supplement the degree 
to which subjects are able to determine locality or sub-group membership.  
Along the second dimension, headshots of ethnic Koreans, Japanese and 
Chinese could be taken, a video greeting in either their prototypical language or in the 
case of bilinguals, the reciprocal prototypical languages of the other ethnic groups. 
Here again certain individuals are trying to pass by using their language skills in a 
second language and would supplement this with using a false name. By the use of a 
headshot alone, subjects would try to use physical characteristics to determine group 
ethnicity and this would be supplemented by the respondents’ use of simple greetings 
and stating their real or a false name in trying to pass as an ethnic other. Again the 
Levenshtein distances could be used to compare situations where people are able to 
pass an ethnic other and where they can not as it provides a basic and numeric 
measure of linguistic distance that could be used to better understand the relationship 
of language relative to ethnic passing within any one region or area. These measures 
could provide a counterbalance to assumptions that the costs of gathering information 
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about the ethnic identities of other is variable across groups and contexts and perhaps 
that collective action may be more difficult in some contexts than in others as many 
theories suggest that groups can recognize and punish defectors.  
These micro-level experiments and macro-level statistical indices focus on the 
measurement of linguistic distance and while applicable to both levels only measures 
one aspect of one ethnic category that is the pronunciation distance between 
languages. The suggestion that this technology be further developed to include similar 
numeric distances applicable to syntactic or possibility semantic distances as well as 
other methodologies that could be used to collect reliable linguistic or other 
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